Evolution, Not Revolution: The Diarra Judgment and Contractual Stability in Global Football

This thesis analyses the legal and economic impact of the Diarra judgment on contractual stability and the global football transfer system. It argues that Diarra should not be understood as a “Bosman 2.0” or as a dismantling of transfer fees, but rather as a recalibration of FIFA’s pre-2025 Article 17 RSTP framework. The thesis examines how the previous regime combined uncertain compensation, joint liability of the new club, sporting sanctions and ITC-related registration risks, creating a deterrent effect on player mobility and club recruitment.

Through EU law principles, particularly Articles 45 and 101 TFEU, it shows that FIFA may continue to protect contractual stability, but only through clearer, more proportionate and predictable rules. The thesis also uses post-Diarra transfer data to demonstrate that the transfer market did not collapse, with 2025 showing record international transfer activity and spending, confirming that the judgment represents evolution rather than revolution in global football regulation.